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Abstract—Continuous biometric authentication schemes
(CBAS) are built around the biometrics supplied by user
behavioural characteristics and continuously check the identity
of the user throughout the session. The current literature for
CBAS primarily focuses on the accuracy of the system in
order to reduce false alarms. However, these attempts do not
consider various issues that might affect practicality in real
world applications and continuous authentication scenarios.
One of the main issues is that the presented CBAS are based
on several samples of training data either of both intruder and
valid users or only the valid users’ profile. This means that
historical profiles for either the legitimate users or possible
attackers should be available or collected before prediction time.
However, in some cases it is impractical to gain the biometric
data of the user in advance (before detection time). Another
issue is the variability of the behaviour of the user between the
registered profile obtained during enrollment, and the profile
from the testing phase. The aim of this paper is to identify
the limitations in current CBAS in order to make them more
practical for real world applications. Also, the paper discusses
a new application for CBAS not requiring any training data
either from intruders or from valid users.
I. INTRODUCTION
Attacks on computer systems can be undertaken at the
network, system or user levels [17]. Network-level attacks
include network denial of service and probing. System-level
attacks include privilege escalation, such as buffer overflow,
program modification, perhaps caused by a Trojan horse or
virus, and denial of service [1]. User-level attacks include
masquerader and imposter attacks. Most research undertaken
in recent years is concerned with system- and network-level
attacks. However, there is a lack of research on attacks at the
user level. This paper focuses on attacks at the user level,
especially attacks during the session.
User-level attacks include the imposter or intruder who takes
over from the valid user, either at the start of a computer
session or during the session. Unauthorised user access was
the second greatest source of financial loss according to a 2006
CSI/FBI Computer Crime and Security Survey [7]. Consider-
ing the risks in highly sensitive environments, a single, initial
authentication might be insufficient to guarantee security. It
may also be necessary to perform continuous authentication to
prevent user substitution after the initial authentication step.
The impact of an intruder during a session is the same
as any kind of false representation at the beginning of a
session. Most current computer systems authorise the user at
the start of a session and do not detect whether the current
user is still the initial authorised user, a substitute user, or
an intruder pretending to be a valid user. Therefore, a system
that continuously checks the identity of the user throughout
the session is necessary. Such a system is called a Continuous
Authentication System (CAS).
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents
CBAS background and the motivation of the paper. In the
following section we highlight the contribution of the paper. In
Section II, we present the CBAS model in order to describe the
characteristics and attributes of existing CBAS, and to describe
the requirements of different scenarios of CBAS. Following
this in Section III, we show the limitations of the existing
CBAS. In Section IV, we describe a new application for CBAS
without utilising training data. The final section concludes the
paper and proposes future work.
A. Continuous Biometric Authentication System (CBAS)
The majority of existing CBAS are built around the bio-
metrics supplied by user traits and characteristics [15]. There
are two major forms of biometrics: those based on physiolog-
ical attributes and those based on behavioural characteristics.
Each one has its advantages and disadvantages. The physical
type includes biometrics based on stable body traits, such
as fingerprint, face, iris, and hand and are considered to be
more robust and secure. However, they are also considered to
be more intrusive and expensive and require regular equip-
ment replacement. On the other hand, the behavioural type
includes learned movements such as handwritten signature,
keyboard dynamics (typing), mouse movements, gait and
speech. They are less obtrusive and they do not require extra
hardware. However, they are considered to be less accurate
than physiological biometrics. This paper will consider the
use of behavioural biometrics for providing continuous user
authentication. Most of the literature in the CBAS is based on
behavioural biometrics.
There has been an ongoing pursuit of improving CBAS.
Recently, efforts have been made to improve CBAS by either
embedding intrusion detection into the CBAS itself [16] or by
adding a new biometric source tailored to the detection system
[21]. However, these attempts do not consider the different
limitations that might affect the practicability of existing
CBAS in real world applications and continuous authentication
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real world applications; it seems reasonable to assume that
this is because existing systems lack practicality. There are a
number of issues associated with existing schemes which may
prevent CBAS from being applied in real world applications.
These limitations include:
• the requirement for the training data to be available in
advance;
• the need for too many training data samples;
• variability of the behaviour biometric between the train-
ing and testing phase; and
• variability of the behaviour biometric of the user from
one context to another.
B. Contribution
A generic model is proposed for most continuous authen-
tication (CA) scenarios and CBAS. The model of CBAS is
proposed based on their detection capabilities to better identify
and understand the characteristics and requirements of each
type of scenario and system. This model pursues two goals:
the first is to describe the characteristics and attributes of
existing CBAS, and the second is to describe the requirements
of different scenarios of CBAS. Also, we identify the main
issues and limitations of existing CBAS, observing that all of
the issues are related to the training data. Finally, we consider a
new application for CBAS without requiring any training data
either from intruders or from valid users in order to make the
CBAS more practical.
II. CBAS MODEL
To date, CBAS have only been described by the techniques
and algorithms used to detect an imposter and to decide
whether or not to raise an alarm. Therefore, there is a need
to build a generic model to help ensure the identification
of the common characteristics and attributes of CBASs. The
traditional authentication mechanisms, such as user name and
password, are used to verify the user only at the start of a
session and do not detect throughout the session whether or
not the current user is still the initial authorised user. The
CBAS is designed to overcome this limitation by continuously
checking the identity of the user throughout the session based
on the physical traits or behavioral characteristics of the user.
A CBAS can be thought of as a kind of intrusion detection
system (IDS). An IDS monitors a series of events, with the aim
of detecting unauthorised activities. In the case of the CBAS,
the unauthorised activity is a person acting as an imposter by
taking over the authenticated session of another (valid) user.
The CBAS attacks include imposters or intruders that take
over from the valid user during the session. However, the IDS
attacks include both external intrusion attacks caused by an
outsider and misuse attacks caused by an insider. Most IDS
operate at the system or network level, and very little research
performed by the intrusion detection community has focused
on monitoring user-level events; notable exceptions include the
recent work by Killourhy and Maxion [14]. In this paper, we
use the more specific term, CBAS, to describe a scheme which
Figure 1. Continuous Biometric Authentication System Model
aims to detect imposters through the continuous monitoring of
a user session.
There are five basic components to describe a typical CBAS
(see Figure II)
1) Subjects: initiators of activity on a target system, nor-
mally users, either authorised or unauthorised [5]. An
authorised user is allowed to access a system by pro-
viding some form of identity and credentials. Also, they
are allowed to deal with objects of the system during the
session. The authorised user can be known to the system
where the biometric data of that user is registered in the
system as a historical profile. On the other hand, the
authorised user can be unknown to the system where
there is no biometric data of that user registered in
the system in advance. The unauthorised user can be
an adversary user acting maliciously towards the valid
user or it can be a colluder invited by the valid user to
complete an action on behalf of the user.
2) Sensor: a device that collects biometric data from the
user, either physically or behaviourally, and translates
it into a signal that can be read by an observer or an
instrument such as keyboard or camera. The aim of data
collection is to obtain biometric data to keep on record,
and to make further analysis of that data. The sensors
are based upon one or more physical traits or behavioral
characteristics [15] for uniquely recognizing humans.
The physical type includes biometrics based on stable
body traits, such as fingerprint, face, iris, and hand [19].
The behavioural type includes learned movements such
as handwritten signature, keyboard dynamics (typing),
mouse movements, gait and speech [22].
3) Detector: compares profiles by analysing the biometric
data and then performs measurements for errors that
may detect the intruder. There are two major algorithms
of detection in the surveyed systems: based on the
historical profile of all the users; or only the valid user
profile. The first method is a type of machine learning
algorithm that requires biometric data about all users,
either valid or possible imposters, to build a model
3for prediction. Another method of algorithm detection
is a type of machine learning algorithm that requires
only biometric data about a single target class in order
to build a model that can be used for prediction. The
accuracy of the correctness of a single measurement will
be set in this component. Accuracy is determined by
comparing the measurement against the true or accepted
value. False acceptance rate, or FAR, measures the
accuracy of the CBAS. It measures the likelihood of
whether the biometric security system will incorrectly
accept an access attempt by an unauthorised user. A
system’s FAR is typically stated as the ratio of the
number of false acceptances divided by the number of
identification attempts. False rejection rate, or FRR, is a
measure of likelihood a biometric security system will
incorrectly reject an access attempt by an authorised
user. A system’s FRR is stated as the ratio of the
number of false rejections divided by the number of
valid identification attempts.
4) Biometric database: a repository containing the profiles
of users as historical data during the enrollment phase.
The profiles could have the trait information of the users
or the characteristics of their behaviour. This storage is
for the registered users who have training data, and the
system will use the training results for comparison in the
verification phase. The location of a biometric database
can be in the client/server depending on the requirements
of the system. The CBAS will use the database for
comparison with the live data in the verification phase.
5) Response unit: takes an appropriate response for detect-
ing the intruder or imposter. The CBAS has two main
types of response: either a passive response or an active
response. A passive system will typically generate an
alert to notify an administrator of the detected activity.
An active system, on the other hand, performs some sort
of response other than generating an alert. Such systems
minimise the damage of the intruder by terminating
network connections or ending the session, for example.
An additional aspect of the CBAS model is the type of setting
(or scenario). A continuous authentication scenario can be
conducted either in an open-setting environment or a closed-
setting environment. Open-setting environments normally are
conducted when the profile of valid users may be available
but the profile of the imposter is not available. Closed-setting
environments are normally conducted when the biometric data
is available from both valid users and imposters. This type of
setting can be considered a restricted environment employing
(physical) access control to exclude any user not registered in
the system.
III. EXISTING CBAS
The existing CBAS schemes can be described based on
the requirement of training data from user. The first class of
CBAS requires the training data for both intruders and valid
users. The second class requires the training data only for the
valid users. The characteristics of the two classes of CBAS
are described below in detail.
A. Class 1
In this class, the identity of the user who initiates the session
is known, as well as the identities of all possible imposters or
colluders. The characteristics of Class 1 are summarised below.
1) This class requires the CA scenario to be in a closed
setting and restricted environment. The environment
should prevent any user not registered in the system from
gaining access.
2) The identity of the authorised user (who initiates the ses-
sion) is known and this user has training data registered
in the database in advance.
3) The unauthorised user such as an imposter or intruder
would try to claim the identity of the authorised user
throughout the session and, it is assumed, will have
training data registered in the database in advance.
4) The unauthorised user in this class might be an adversary
or a colluder. The adversarial user may be deliberately
acting maliciously towards the valid user. This may
happen when the authenticated user is harmed by a
malicious person or they forget to log off at the end
of the session. In this case, the malicious person may
conduct some actions or events on behalf of the valid
user. Alternatively, the colluding user may be invited
by the valid user to complete an action on behalf of
the user. The victim in this case would be the system
operator or the owner of the application. We note that
collusion is not always for bidden, however below we
provide an example of where it would be desirable to
detect collusion.
5) The labelled normal data from the valid users and
anomalous data from possible imposters should be used
in order to build the detection model. This approach
is similar to the multi-class classifier that learns to
differentiate between all classes in the training data. This
classifier is then used to predict the class of an unseen
instance by matching it to the closest known class.
This class could be suitable for some scenarios held in
restricted environments where the biometric data for both
valid users and possible imposters is available. All of these
characteristics of Class 1 are applicable to the computer-based
exam scenario described below as Scenario 1. In the computer-
based exam scenario we can collect the training data for both
valid users and attackers before-hand.
Scenario 1: Consider a computer-based exam in a con-
trolled environment. Such exams are traditionally conducted in
closed-setting environments and the intruder is likely to come
from inside. This form of vulnerability is known as an insider
threat in the computer security environment [20]. The location
of data collection in this scenario might be considered as
centralised as it occurs in closed-setting environments and the
location of data processing would be centralised on a computer
server. The system would verify the student at the start of the
exam, but the teacher or instructor cannot be sure whether the
exam has been completed only by the valid student. Threats
include a substitute student completing the exam on behalf of
the valid student who is already authenticated at the start of
the exam.
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that fall under Class 1. Gunetti et al. [8] created profiles for
each user based upon their typing characteristics in free text.
They performed a series of experiments using the degree of
disorder to measure the distance between the profiles of known
users to determine how well such a measure performs when
assigning unidentified users to known profiles.
Pusara et al. [21] applied a similar approach using mouse
movements to compare a test sample to every reference sample
in the database. In that case, the learning algorithm used the
training data for all users to determine decision boundaries
that discriminate between these users by matching the closest
user.
B. Class 2
The main difference between Class 1 and Class 2 is that in
Class 2 we do not assume that a profile is available for the
imposter. That is, the identity of authorised user who initiates
the session is known (as is their corresponding profile which
is stored in the database), but no profile is available for the
imposter. The characteristics of the class can be summarised
as follows.
1) This class requires the CA scenario to be in the open
setting in a non-restricted environment. The environment
could be in a public location where any user can use the
computer system.
2) The user who is authorised to use the system at the start
of the session could be a known user (as in Class 1).
3) The authorised user who is already authenticated at the
start of the session should have training data registered
in the database in advance (as in Class 1).
4) The training data for the unauthorised user, such as
an imposter or intruder, who would try to claim the
identity of the authenticated user during the session is
not available or it is not possible to collect such data in
advance of the prediction time.
5) The unauthorised user in this class would be an adver-
sary user and the victim in this case would be the end
user.
6) The labeled normal data from the valid users should
be used in order to build the detection model. This
approach is similar to the one-class classifier that learns
to differentiate between one class in the training data,
which is then used to predict the class of an unseen
instance by making a decision about whether or not
it is related or similar enough to the training class.
Since systems in class 2 do not require labels for the
anomaly class, they are more widely applicable than
multi-class classification techniques. The approach used
in such techniques is to build a model for the class
corresponding to normal behaviour, and use the model
to identify anomalies in the test data.
All of these characteristics of Class 2 are present in the online
banking scenario described below as Scenario 2 . In the online
banking scenario the training data for only the valid users is
available or collected before prediction time. So, this class
could be suitable for some scenarios held in non-restricted
environments such as public locations where the biometric
data for possible imposters is not available or where it is not
possible to collect such data in advance.
Scenario 2: In an online banking system, transactions are
typically made in an open-setting environment and the intruder
is likely to come from outside. This form of vulnerability is
known as the outsider threat. The location of data collection
in this scenario might be distributed as it occurs in open-
setting environment and the location of data processing would
be centralised on a computer server. The bank administration
normally secures the communication channels between the
user and server in the bank in order to avoid threats to
the network traffic. However, threats can occur at the user
level when the system authenticates the user at the start
of the session and later if the user leaves without logging
off from the session. An intruder can then take over and
conduct transactions on behalf of the valid user who is already
authenticated. The system accepts the whole transaction as
performed by the valid user.
There are a number of examples of existing CBAS schemes
that fall under Class 2. Hempstalk et al. [11] created profiles
only for valid users based upon their typing characteristics
in free text. They performed a series of experiments using
the Gaussian density estimation techniques by applying and
extending an existing classification algorithm to the one-
class classification problem that describes only the valid user
biometric data. They applied a density estimator algorithm in
order to generate a representative density for the valid users
data in the training phase, and then combined the predictions
of the representative density of the valid user and the class
probability model for predicting the new test cases.
Azzini et al. [3] applied a similar approach using multi-
modal biometrics including face recognition and fingerprint to
compare unidentified data to only the valid users data in the
database. At prediction time, the learning algorithm used the
training data for only the valid user to determine a decision
based on comparison between the unidentified data with the
class of the valid users.
C. Limitations in the current CBAS
Most previous CBAS schemes are mainly concerned with
the accuracy of the system in reducing false alarms. However,
these schemes do not consider issues that might affect their
practicality in different real world applications and continuous
authentication scenarios. All previous schemes require training
data either of both intruder and valid users like Class 1, or of
valid users like Class 2. Limitations related to the training data
which prevent CBAS from being applied in a practical way as
a real world application include the following.
1) The existing schemes require the historical profile either
from legitimate users or from possible attackers to
be available or collected before prediction time. It is
impossible in some cases to gain the biometric data of
the user in advance of the detection time.
2) Some schemes require many training samples of the user
in the enrollment phase in order to build a profile of
that user and apply it in the testing or comparison phase.
5This is likely to present a severe inconvenience for some
users.
3) User behaviour biometric data varies between the train-
ing and testing profile. The cause of the variability of
the data could be due to the following. a) The valid
user physical mood is not the same at all times and
could well be different between the enrollment phase
and testing phase. This could affect the user’s typing
speed, for example. As a result, the false rejection rate
can be increased. b) The typing speed of the valid user
changes over time. This can affect the stability of the
keystroke dynamics systems, for example.
4) User behaviour varies from one context to another, so
every context needs a new historical profile for compar-
ison in that context. For example, typing speed in an
online exam may not be the same as the typing speed
in the case of typing email.
5) Comparison between the new profile and the historical
profiles in the database takes time and can delay the
detection.
IV. A NEW APPLICATION FOR CBAS
In this section, we describe a new application for CBAS
which, in a sense, is the most difficult case. In this application,
we assume that no profile information is available for any
users, authorised or not, at the beginning of the session. We
do however, assume that the user who initiates the session is
‘authorised’ to do so. The challenge here is to build a profile of
this ‘authorised’ user while, at the same time, trying to decide
whether or not the session has been taken over by an imposter.
A summary of the characteristics of the new application for
CBAS follows.
1) This class requires the CA scenario to be in the open
setting and in a non-restricted environment. The envi-
ronment should be in a public location so that any user
can use the computer system (as in Class 2).
2) While the identity of the (authorised) user who initiates
the session may be known, no profile for this user is
available prior to the commencement of the session.
3) Similarly, the training data for the unauthorised user is
not available or cannot be collected before the prediction
time.
4) The unauthorised user in this class would be be an
adversary user and the victim in this case of attacking
would be the end user (as in Class 2).
5) There are no labels from both normal and anomalous
data to be used in order to build the detection model
in this class. This approach is similar to change point
detection [12] that learns from the data on the fly.
It considers probability distributions from which data
in the past and present intervals are generated, and
regards the target time point as a change point if two
distributions are significantly different. Other methods
may also be applicable to the new application.
In this class, the system determines whether the biometric data
in the testing phase is related to one user or two users by trying
to identify any significant change within the biometric data.
There are three main challenges associated with this class.
1) How much biometric data should be available before it is
possible to identify a significant change in the biometric
data related to the imposter or intruder?
2) How much time does the system need to detect the
imposter?
3) How can the system determine the start and the end
activity of an imposter or intruder?
While there are likely to be a number of existing techniques
which are potentially useful for the new application of CBAS,
we note that most of the characteristics of this class are similar
to the change point detection problem, and here we focus
the discussion on assessing the applicability of change point
detection techniques to the new application for CBAS. Future
work will be required to perform a practical evaluation of the
applicability of change point detection techniques for CBAS.
Change point detection is the problem of discovering time
points at which properties of time-series data change [12].
Change point detection has been applied to a broad range of
real world problems such as fraud detection in cellular systems
[18], intrusion detection in computer networks [2], irregular-
motion detection in vision systems [13], signal segmentation
in data streams [4], and fault detection in engineering sys-
tems [6].
There is a clear need to develop some schemes for the
new application for CBAS associated with change point al-
gorithms. Various approaches to change-point detection have
been investigated within this statistical framework, including
the CUSUM (cumulative sum) [2] and GLR (generalized
likelihood ratio) [10][9].
We now provide an example of the basic of CUSUM
to show how it can be applied with CBAS. Let
X1, X2, ........X100 represent 100 data points. In the case
of behavioural biometrics the data points could be the time
between consecutive keystrokes, for example. From this, the
cumulative sums S0, S1, S2, ....S100 are calculated. Notice that
100 data points leads to 101 (0 through 100) sums. The
cumulative sums are calculated as follows.
1) First calculate the average:
V =
v1 + v2 + ...+ v100
100
(1)
2) Start the cumulative sum at zero by setting S0 = 0.
3) Calculate the other cumulative sums by adding the
difference between the value of current data point and
the average to the previous sum
Si = S(i−1) + (Xi − V ) (2)
for i = 1, 2, .......100.
Here Si denotes the score of cumulative sum for the current
value, S(i−1) the previous score of cumulative sum, and Xi
the current value. V is the average of all values in the case
of offline detection, but in case of online detection it will be
the average value for the previous values. As the average is
subtracted from each value, the cumulative sum also ends at
zero (S100 = 0). After that, we compare the score of the
6cumulative sum for each value with the threshold in order to
identify the change in the data.
We can extend the basic technique of CUSUM to be based
on a growing window. In the growing window method, the
number of patterns or values is not fixed but increases. When a
new pattern is added to the data set, the oldest patterns stay so
that the growing window stores all the patterns that have been
granted access as authenticated patterns. Another approach that
might be used with CUSUM is the sliding window concept.
In the sliding window method, the number of patterns is fixed.
When a new pattern is added to the data set, the oldest pattern
is removed. These, and other approaches need to be compared
to determine the strength of each one.
The new schemes associated with change point algorithms
may overcome the current limitations in the CBAS that have
been identified in Section III-C. Specifically, change point
analysis can be applied without the need for training data. New
schemes associated with change point detection algorithms
detect the attacker based on the data itself and, therefore, have
the potential to be faster. However, further research is required
to explore suitable behavioural biometric features for use in
such change point detection algorithms.
Table II summarises the differences between the first, sec-
ond and the new application.
Characteristics Class 1 Class 2 New
application
Type of
environment
Closed Open Open
Training data Authorised /
unauthorised user
Authorised
user
None
Unauthorised
user
Adversary /
colluder
Adversary Adversary
Victim type System operator /
owner of the
application
End user End user
Algorithm type Multi-class
classification
One-class
classification
Change point
detection
(potentially)
Table I
THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE FIRST, SECOND CLASSES AND THE NEW
APPLICATION.
V. CONCLUSION
We have analysed existing continuous biometric authenti-
cation schemes and described sample continuous authentica-
tion scenarios. We identified the common characteristics and
attributes from the generic model of CBAS. To date there
is no CBAS deployed in real world applications, probably
because the existing systems lack practicality. We observed
that the main limitations are related to the training data which
prevent CBAS to be applicable in the real world applications.
The problems are the requirement of the training data to
be available in advance, too many training data samples
required, the variability of the behaviour biometric between
the training and testing phase in case of the comparison time
and the variability of the behaviour biometric of the user
from one context to another. Finally, the paper considered a
new application for CBAS associated (potentially) with change
point detection algorithms that does not require training data
for both intruder and valid users which can overcome the
identified limitations associated with the existing CBAS.
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